mypeez : ... Specifically, it seems, the exchange rate between the Euro, Pound Sterling, USD and Argentine Peso. They never, ever believed that the Euro and USD would be worth just about the same. I really, really do wonder if that could also be the case of KDG too. In recent weeks, in some places, some other projects , CA included, have crashed and burned, shall we say, because of the crypto currency situation and foreign currency trading losses. So, I have no choice but to think that COULD be an issue in this case too.
@billybob : I can't find the full Frontline episode on it, but here is the written narrative on the "biggest" currency collapse we never heard of.
The Forewarning in 1998: Long-Term Capital Managementwww.shoppbs.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline /warning/themes/ltcm .htmlPeople had always wondered, sort of academically, would it be possible to have a derivative chain reaction, some collapse that would lead to a so-called systemic crisis, meaning obviously that the system was threatened, not just one firm or two firms?
And that summer [of 1998], out of nowhere, Russia, which had been the darling of Wall Street -- everybody wanted to float bonds for Russia -- Russia defaults on their ruble-denominated debt.
And ... basically markets say: "OK, it was a bad move to take risks on Russia. We don't know what other risks are good. Therefore, we don't want any risks."
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) is a hedge fund in Greenwich, [Conn.], which really no one had heard of except for the Wall Street cognoscenti. It had fewer than 200 employees, had 16 partners, but was leveraged something like 30 or 40:1. Had all kinds of derivative bets, but all their bets were pointed one way, which was it was betting people would become less worried about risk.
And when they became more worried about risk -- and the firm had all sorts of models that said, no matter what happened, based on history, they couldn't lose more than $35 million a day -- they started dropping $300, 400, 500 million every day.
They had had $7 billion of capital. They thought they had so much capital, they gave back $3 billion to their investors right before this. Then they start losing these chunks.
Everyone else on Wall Street had similar bets to them. They're sort of sucked down into this vortex, and the more they try to sell out of these things, the more the steamroller goes.
And Wall Street freaks is what happens.
The New York Federal Reserve calls in the top 14, 15 banks to say: "LTCM's going to go down. Who knows who it'll take down with them? You guys ought to do something with them." And 14 banks agree to put up a few hundred million each, about $3.5 billion total. One bank refuses. That was Bear Stearns, incidentally. …
One of the things with LTCM is that no one had any idea. … No one knew how many other people had the same position and how much the market was on one side of it, how big that side was. And this was one of the things that making derivatives exchange-traded might go to.
So there was this momentary period when people said, "You know, we got pretty close to the edge." LTCM was a very scary moment.
It really was?
Yeah, it was very scary. Credit markets around the world just shut down. There was a two-, three-, four-week period of real panic. People were very, very frightened. Even Goldman Sachs lost a billion dollars. They had to cancel their public offering. Merrill Lynch lost a tremendous -- and these firms were worried about, in some cases, their future; in some cases, their survival.
It was a real bloodletting. So there was this shrinking back then. And people said a lot of things which they ended up not meaning, like, "We're never going to get leveraged again like this." Of course, they did. And, "We're going to look harder at derivatives." That was another one of the things they said that didn't last long.
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