Could The War in Iraq Be Avoided? on the Peoria.com Forums

Mitt Romney:

BS, he sent troops to Iraq because he had a vendetta that superseded the need to hunt down Bin Laden.

Sad Part: Is Romney should know that indeed, inspectors were let into Iraq, and prior to the war they were saying there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

So, Either Romney is ignorant, or willingly, still misleading Americans about why we went to war, spent trillions and lost so many american lives.

When are you guys gonna give it a rest? Diapers need to be changed eventually. The fact is, regime change in Iraq was not carried out at the expense of finding Osama bin Laden. Totally different sets of resources were needed to oust Saddam Hussein from power and locate OBL. After all, when we killed him in his Pakistan compound in May 2011, our forces were still operating in Iraq.

Fact is, there was NO reason to go into Iraq when we did. None. The mission was to secure justice for the 9/11 attacks, which we lessened our attack on to invade Iraq.

but keep drinking your Kool Aid

The inspectors were harrassed by uncooperative Iraqi officials and left in 1998. Iraq had plenty of time to destroy evidence of continuing weapons programs between Bush's January 2002 "Axis of Evil" speech and the invasion, which took place in March 2003.

The fact is, U. S. military personnel there discovered cannisters containing blistering agents and mustard gas. So rather than organized chemical weapons production, the Iraqis apparently disposed of this stuff haphazardly, a fact that could have made it easier for terrorists to obtain them.

The invasion to oust Saddam Hussein from power was justified. But the way we dealt with insurgents and terrorists (many of whom infiltrated the country afterward) was incompetent. We got Abu Musab al-Zarqawi but we should have killed Muqtada al-Sadr as well.

UN Inspectors were in Iraq prior to the war. They were reporting to the UN; prior to the war, that Iraq did not have a weapons program, or weapons.

Knowing those facts, how can Romney sit there and make such statements.

Politicians rely on an uninformed/apathetic public so they do not have to be factual.

If you're trying to convince me, you failed. The mission was to eliminate a terrorist regime that threatened the United States' national security. Long-forgotten is that in the summer of 2001, French, German and Russian "peace" groups went to Iraq in violation of the embargo. That and the UN oil-for-food bribery scandal showed how the sanctions were failing, and Iraq was gaining sympathetic support from nations that had previously sided with the US during Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

After 9-11, there was legitimate concern that Saddam Hussein would be a natural ally of al-Qaida, and could provide its expertise (if not actual materials and weapons) in WMD's. Thus, REGIME CHANGE WAS JUSTIFIED.

As far as I'm concerned, what we did was the same as if France and the UK had renewed hostilities with Germany after it ceased the Sudetenland in 1935.

Iraq was never a threat to the US.

Well, under your way of thinking, why haven't we attacked N. Korea, who DOES pose a risk to US Soldiers stationed just across the border, and whom presumably has a Nuke program and missiles capable of reaching the West Coast of the US.

Iraq did not a risk similar to N. Korea. So, explain this again?

"Why We Didn't Remove Saddam"

George Bush [Sr.] and Brent Scowcroft
Time (2 March 1998)

The end of effective Iraqi resistance came with a rapidity which surprised us all, and we were perhaps psychologically unprepared for the sudden transition from fighting to peacemaking. True to the guidelines we had established, when we had achieved our strategic objectives (ejecting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and eroding Saddam's threat to the region) we stopped the fighting. But the necessary limitations placed on our objectives, the fog of war, and the lack of "battleship Missouri" surrender unfortunately left unresolved problems, and new ones arose.

We were disappointed that Saddam's defeat did not break his hold on power, as many of our Arab allies had predicted and we had come to expect. President Bush repeatedly declared that the fate of Saddam Hussein was up to the Iraqi people. Occasionally, he indicated that removal of Saddam would be welcome, but for very practical reasons there was never a promise to aid an uprising. While we hoped that popular revolt or coup would topple Saddam, neither the U.S. nor the countries of the region wished to see the breakup of the Iraqi state. We were concerned about the long-term balance of power at the head of the Gulf. Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into an occupation of Iraq, would have violated our guideline about not changing objectives in midstream, engaging in "mission creep," and would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. Apprehending him was probably impossible. We had been unable to find Noriega in Panama, which we knew intimately. We would have been forced to occupy Baghdad and, in effect, rule Iraq. The coalition would instantly have collapsed, the Arabs deserting it in anger and other allies pulling out as well. Under those circumstances, furthermore, we had been self-consciously trying to set a pattern for handling aggression in the post-cold war world. Going in and occupying Iraq, thus unilaterally exceeding the U.N.'s mandate, would have destroyed the precedent of international response to aggression we hoped to establish. Had we gone the invasion route, the U.S. could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land. It would have been a dramatically different--and perhaps barren--outcome.

We discussed at length forcing Saddam himself to accept the terms of Iraqi defeat at Safwan--just north of the Kuwait-Iraq border--and thus the responsibility and political consequences for the humiliation of such a devastating defeat. In the end, we asked ourselves what we would do if he refused. We concluded that we would be left with two options: continue the conflict until he backed down, or retreat from our demands. The latter would have sent a disastrous signal. The former would have split our Arab colleagues from the coalition and, de facto, forced us to change our objectives. Given those unpalatable choices, we allowed Saddam to avoid personal surrender and permitted him to send one of his generals. Perhaps we could have devised a system of selected punishment, such as air strikes on different military units, which would have proved a viable third option, but we had fulfilled our well-defined mission; Safwan was waiting.

As the conflict wound down, we felt a sense of urgency on the part of the coalition Arabs to get it over with and return to normal. This meant quickly withdrawing U.S. forces to an absolute minimum. Earlier there had been some concern in Arab ranks that once they allowed U.S. forces into the Middle East, we would be there to stay. Saddam's propaganda machine fanned these worries. Our prompt withdrawal helped cement our position with our Arab allies, who now trusted us far more than they ever had. We had come to their assistance in their time of need, asked nothing for ourselves, and left again when the job was done. Despite some criticism of our conduct of the war, the Israelis too had their faith in us solidified. We had shown our ability--and willingness--to intervene in the Middle East in a decisive way when our interests were challenged. We had also crippled the military capability of one of their most bitter enemies in the region. Our new credibility (coupled with Yasser Arafat's need to redeem his image after backing the wrong side in the war) had a quick and substantial payoff in the form of a Middle East peace conference in Madrid.

The Gulf War had far greater significance to the emerging post-cold war world than simply reversing Iraqi aggression and restoring Kuwait. Its magnitude and significance impelled us from the outset to extend our strategic vision beyond the crisis to the kind of precedent we should lay down for the future. From an American foreign-policymaking perspective, we sought to respond in a manner which would win broad domestic support and which could be applied universally to other crises. In international terms, we tried to establish a model for the use of force. First and foremost was the principle that aggression cannot pay. If we dealt properly with Iraq, that should go a long way toward dissuading future would-be aggressors. We also believed that the U.S. should not go it alone, that a multilateral approach was better. This was, in part, a practical matter. Mounting an effective military counter to Iraq's invasion required the backing and bases of Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.

The only reason we attacked Iraq is so that W. could wear his flight suit and be a poser vet.

We shouldn't of attacked Iraq. They weren't a threat, they didn't have WMD, we have no constitutional, moral or legal authority to export Democracy.

We should lead the world by example, not by the threat of deadly force. I enjoy reading about how Great America was when she lead by principles, not murder. Too bad those stories are only told in history books.

There are 7 or 8 countries on the Leaders hit list and bringing the population to peace isn't on the table. Israel is, and has been the driver of U.S. policy over decades both here and abroad. The American taxpayer has 'made' them as it watches and wonders what's wrong at home. Anxoius voters with their wallets have faith that THEIR man is the best regardless of blantant deceit by both candidates. It's which one lies the least and has the most money. Hey I'm bad, but trust me he's worse.
The only thing government does is break legs and then hand out crutches and ritcheously claim without them we wouldn't be walking..